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Abstract:  The employment behavior of mothers is strongly influenced by labor market regulations 
and certain institutional arrangements, which both vary greatly across European countries. Using 
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) 1994-2001 for Denmark, Germany, Italy and 
the United Kingdom, which represent four distinct ‘institutional regimes’, we estimate the short-run 
and long-term effects of childbirth on married women’s employment and working hours. Estimation 
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1 Introduction   
During the past few decades most industrialized countries have experienced a sharp increase in 
female labor force participation. In particular, maternal employment has risen in almost all 
European countries. Despite the common trend of rising female employment rates, their labor 
market participation is still lower than that of men. Women’s employment patterns also differ 
enormously across countries, regarding both the level of labor force participation and average 
working hours. Recent empirical research based on comparable data for various countries of the 
European Union has established some important factors contributing to persistent country 
differences in female labor market behavior. These factors include labor market regulations and 
public policies related to childbirth and caring for children (for summaries see, e.g., OECD 2001, 
Jaumotte 2003). The relationship between childbirth and mothers’ employment is considered to be 
of substantial policy relevance in several European countries with ageing societies because of 
relatively low fertility rates and low employment rates of mothers.  
We empirically analyze the short-run and long-term effects of childbirth on married (or 
cohabitating) mothers’ employment and working hours in four European countries. These countries 
are selected to represent distinct “institutional regimes” regarding family policy and labor market 
institutions, namely Denmark, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The empirical analysis is 
based on the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) which provides comparable panel 
data for these four countries over the period 1994 to 2001. We focus on married mothers because 
labor market behavior of this group is much more affected by childbirth than that of lone mothers, 
and country differences are also more pronounced for the former group.  
An important feature of our analysis is that we distinguish between the short- and long-term 
effects of a birth of a child on women's labor supply, both on the extensive (participation) and 
intensive (working hours) labor supply margins. These effects may differ due to “state dependence” 
in individual labor market behavior, which implies that a woman’s employment during the current 
period affects, for structural reasons, her employment in future periods (Heckman and Willis 1977, 
Heckman and MaCurdy 1980, Altug and Miller 1998). This structural dependence may be related to 
the accumulation of human capital while working or arise because continuous employment acts as a 
positive signal to firms screening job applicants. Due to state dependence, there may also be a 
trade-off between the short-run and long-term effects of policies aimed at increasing employment of 
mothers. For example, while paid maternity leave may increase employment rates of mothers after 
childbirth (see, e.g., Ruhm 1998), extended periods of leave may reduce mothers’ future 
employment rates (see, e.g., Ondrich et al. 1999, Voicu and Buddelmeyer 2003).  
Recent empirical research on the effects of childbirth on mothers’ labor market behavior has 
focused on the labor force participation decision, i.e. the extensive labor supply margin (see, e.g.,   2
Hyslop 1999, Michaud and Tatsiramos 2005 for six European countries, Voicu and Buddelmeyer 
2003 and Croda and Kyriazidou 2004 for Germany). We contribute to the literature by analyzing 
the effects of childbirth on mothers’ working hours, i.e. the intensive margin, as well as on the 
extensive labor supply margin. As in Michaud and Tatsiramos (2005), we use a panel data set with 
comparable information for various countries, the European Community Household Panel, but 
select countries to represent the four “institutional regimes” prevailing in Europe and try to link 
country differences in estimated short-run and long-term effects of childbirth on mothers’ 
employment and working hours to differing combinations of labor market flexibility and family 
policies in these countries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we motivate the 
choice of countries for the analysis representing different “institutional regimes” in the European 
Union. In the next section, we describe the data and present some descriptive evidence on the 
relationship between married women’s labor market behavior and the presence of children in the 
household. Section 4 contains the specification and estimation of the empirical employment and 
hours equations used to analyze the short-run and long-term effects of childbirth on married 
mothers’ labor market behavior. Estimation results, summarized and discussed in section 5, show 
that both short-run and long-run effects differ significantly across the four countries analyzed here, 
that state dependence effects within countries are also markedly different between the two labor 
supply margins, and that these effects seem compatible with the prevailing combinations of labor 
market flexibility and family policies in the four countries analyzed in this study. Section 6 
summarizes the main results of the study and concludes.  
 
2 Institutional  Regimes 
Empirical literature has identified various factors related to both labor market regulation and public 
policies affecting employment rates and working hours of married mothers (see, e.g., Esping-
Andersen 1990, Gauthier 2002, Jaumotte 2003). In the European Union various “institutional 
regimes” can be identified which differ in terms of these factors. Simplifying somewhat, one can 
define four institutional regimes: 
-  The first regime, which includes Denmark and the Scandinavian countries, represents the 
universal welfare state with relatively flexible labor markets and high employment rates, 
especially of married mothers. The universal welfare state is financed by relatively high taxes on 
labor income and/or social security contributions.  
- The  conservative welfare state regime, which includes Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, and 
the Netherlands, differs from the first group in that social transfers are related to previous 
earnings, in principle, with means-tested social transfers acting as a residual safety net. These   3
countries, also impose, although to a varying degree, relatively high income taxes and especially 
social security contributions. Labor markets in these countries tend to be more regulated than in 
the first group, with relatively low employment rates and short average working hours of married 
mothers (“secondary earners”). The male “bread-winner model” still dominates. 
-  The institutional regime prevailing in Southern-European countries is similar to the one of the 
second group along certain dimensions, but differs by its stronger reliance on family ties rather 
than social insurance. Compared to both the universal and the conservative welfare state regime, 
mandatory social security contributions are relatively low.  
-  Finally, the group of countries making up the liberal welfare state regime features relatively 
flexible labor markets as well as means-tested social transfers and tends to rely on the market for 
the provision of social services, in particular also the provision of child care. Labor market 
regulation is relatively weak, income taxes and social security contributions are low compared to 
both the universal and the conservative welfare state regime. In the European Union, the sole 
representative of this regime is generally considered to be the United Kingdom.   
To represent these four institutional regimes, for the following empirical analysis we select 
Denmark, Germany
1, Italy and the United Kingdom. We limit the analysis to these four countries 
because, first, we consider them to appropriately represent each of the four regimes in terms of 
important differences in institutional factors determining women’s labor market behavior across 
Europe.
2 In principle, other countries also could have chosen to represent particular institutional 
regimes. For example, Denmark and Sweden do differ somewhat in terms of institutional factors 
influencing mothers employment behavior (see, e.g. Pylkkänen and Smith 2004), so do Germany 
and France representing both belonging to the conservative welfare state regime (see, e.g., Barclet, 
Dell and Wrohlich 2005). To keep the empirical analysis comprehensible, we selected just one 
typical country to represent a particular regime on the basis of the principle of maximizing 
institutional differences across regimes (i.e., choosing Germany rather than France on account of 
the latter’s more employment-friendly family policy) as well as data availability (e.g., for Sweden 
the ECHP only started in 1997). Details on institutional differences across these four countries are 
summarized in Table 1, where we differentiate between employment regulation, family policies, 
social security regulations, and income taxation. 
                                                 
1 Although labor force participation rates and working hours of employed married women still differ significantly 
between east and west Germany, we do not analyse the two regions separately here because our estimation strategy is 
based on changes over time rather than levels information, and convergence in labour market outcomes between the 
two regions has virtually come to an end already in the mid-nineties (see, e.g., Franz and Steiner 2000). Our 
estimation approach does, however, account for time invariant differences between east and west. 
2  Nowadays, one would also have to add a group of previously Communist European countries to one or the other of 
the institutional regimes. Since the observation period of the subsequent empirical analysis ends in 2001, and 
comparable data for these countries are not available for the 1990’s, we do not consider these countries here.     4
Table 1    Institutional regimes compared – Denmark, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom    
Family policies  Country 
Employment regulation  Maternity /  
child-care leave 
a) 
Cash support  Child care
 b)  School schedules  Social insurance  Income taxation 
Denmark  Flexible working hours, 
high employment rate, 
women work most often 
full-time. Low long and 
short term unemployment, 
i.e. flexible in terms of 





100 % of average 
wage 






Medium level of 
universal cash support 
for families, but high 
level of other forms of 
support that result in 
low levels of child 
poverty 
A very high number of 
childcare facilities for 
children age < 3 years 
(64% coverage),  
3< aged ≤ 6 yrs.:  very 
good coverage  (91%) 
Opening hours: 
8:00-15.00 




Social security is mainly financed 
through taxes. All residents are covered 
by the public health insurance and have 
free and equal access to the services of 
the health insurance and to hospital aid. 
The government provides a basic old age 
pension for everyone in Denmark. 
Individual taxation 
Average tax rates second 
earner/single
 c): 
50 / 41 / 1.2  
51 / 44 / 1.2 
 
Germany  Part-time employment very 
common, flexible working 
hours, in particular in the 
public sector 





100 % of average 
wage 




Medium to high level of 
cash support. 
Limited childcare 
facilities for children 
age < 3 years (10%),  




increase with age 
from 2.5 to 4.5 hours 
a day 
Meal provision / 
supervision during 
lunch break: 
Very few places 
Married women automatically co-insured 
if non-employed and spouse covered by 
social insurance (all employees below a 
relatively high income threshold); 
mandatory contributions to the social 
insurance funds at a rate of about 40% 
(employee and employer contributions) if 
employed; availability of actuarially fair 
private health insurance   
Joint taxation 
Average tax rates second 
earner/single
 b): 
50 / 34 / 1.5 
53 / 42 / 1.3 
Italy  Scarcity of part-time 
employment and flexible 
working hours; high long 
term unemployment 
Maternity leave: 
21.5  weeks 
Maternity benefits: 
80 % of average wage 






Low level of cash 
support that results in 
high levels of child 
poverty. 
Very limited childcare 
facilities for children 
age < 3 years (6%),   
3< aged ≤ 6 yrs.:  very 
good coverage (95%) 
Opening hours: 
8:00-12.30,  min. 27 
hours/week 
8:00-16:30, max. 30 
hours/week 





National Insurance contributions are 
payable by employees earning more than 
a certain threshold. Depending on 
eligibility criteria members of the 
National Insurance scheme 
qualify for pensions, sickness, industrial 
injury and unemployment benefits. 
 
Individual taxation 
Average tax rates second 
earner/single
 b): 
38 / 24 / 1.6  
39 / 29 / 1.4 
UK  High share of part-time 
employment, flexible 





44 % of average wage 






Low level of cash 
support for families, 
relatively higher for 
families in greater need, 
(e.g. working families 
tax credit) 
A high number of 
childcare facilities for 
children age < 3 years 
(34%),  




  9:00-12.00 
13:00-15:30 hours 
increase with age of 
child 




Individual based social insurance. Basic 
medical care is mainly financed through 
taxes, small proportion from National 
Insurance contributions and patients’ 
co-payments. All residents are covered 
by the public health insurance. 
Individual taxation 
Average tax rates second 
earner/single 
b): 
24 / 19 / 1.3  
36 / 24 / 1.1 
Notes:   a) Years refer to 1998 for Denmark and Italy and 2000 for Germany and the UK (OECD 2001, Table 4.7, Jaumotte 2003, Table 3). 
c) Numbers refer to 1998 for Denmark and Italy and to 2000 for the UK and Germany (OECD 2001). 
b) The first line refers to women earning 67% of the “Average Production Worker’s Wage” in 2001, the second line to women earnings 100% of APW (Jaumotte 2003). Numbers in italics are 
ratios of tax rates of second earners and singles.  
Source:  Own compilation.   5
3  Descriptive Evidence on Employment and Working Hours of Mothers  
The subsequent empirical analysis is based on the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). 
The major advantage of the ECHP is that it provides harmonized high-quality panel data for a large 
number of European countries. The first wave of the ECHP was carried out in 1994 in twelve 
European countries. When it was terminated in 2001, fifteen European countries were represented 
in the ECHP, among them the four countries we analyze here.
3 For the four countries analyzed here, 
the total number of female respondents in the period 1994-2001 range from about 19,000 in 
Denmark to about 66,000 in Italy.
4 For the following empirical analysis, we select two sub-samples. 
The first is restricted to all married or cohabitating women aged 20-50 years. Women in education 
or vocational training are excluded from the sample. The second sub-sample excludes all women 
who do not work. Respondents are coded as "employed" if they report to have worked at least one 
hour during the week before the interview. For employed women, working hours in the main and 
any additional job during the week before the interview are also available in the ECHP. Table A1 in 
the Appendix reports the number of respondents per wave and country for both samples. 
Employment rates of married women aged 20-50 differ greatly between the four countries. 
Within our observation the period 1994-2001, the average employment rate ranges from almost 
90% in Denmark to just 50% in Italy, with Germany (66%) and the UK (76%) being in-between 
these two extremes (see Table A2 in the Appendix). Hence, average weekly working hours also 
differ markedly across countries if calculated for the whole sample of married women. If non-
employed married women are included with zero hours, the average number of weekly working 
hours ranges from 17.2 in Italy (with a standard deviation of about 19 hours) to about 31.5 (13.8) in 
Denmark. For this group, average weekly working time is 21.9 hours in Germany and 24.8 hours in 
the UK. Conditional on employment, cross country differences in average working hours are 
relatively small, ranging from 35.5 hours per week in Denmark (with a standard deviation of 8.5 
hours) to 32.5 hours (13.2) in the UK (see Table A2). In Italy, the small share of employed married 
women apparently work, on average, longer hours than in Germany and the UK. In other words, if 
married women work at all in Italy, they tend to work full-time. Part-time work is more prevalent in 
Germany and the United Kingdom than in Denmark or Italy.  
To which extent are these employment patterns across countries related to the presence of 
children in the household? Figure 1 presents employment rates and average weekly working hours  
                                                 
3  In 1997, Germany and the UK terminated the original ECHP survey. For these countries, existing national panel 
studies – the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) and the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) – were 
substituted for the ECHP to generate comparable data covering the period from 1994 to 2001 (EUROSTAT 1996). 
4 The exact numbers are 18,882 for Denmark, 38,026 for Germany, 66,006 for Italy, and 48,408 for the UK. To the 
extent and potential effects of sample attrition in the ECHP, see Behr, Bellgardt and Rendtel (2005).   6
Figure 1  Average employment rates of married or cohabitating women by country, number of 
children and age of youngest child (2000/2001) 
 









Source:  ECHP, waves 2000/2001, own calculations.  
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Figure 2  Average weekly working hours of married or cohabitating women by country, number of 
children and age of youngest child (2000/2001) 
 









Source:  ECHP, waves 2000/2001, own calculations.        8
for the years 2000/2001 stratified by country and by the number of children.
5 As shown in Figure 
1a, employment rates of married women decline markedly with the number of children in all 
countries, except for Denmark, although to a varying degree. This decline is particularly strong in 
Italy and Germany, where employment rates of married women with one child are some 20 
percentage points lower, on average, than the respective rates of women without children. In stark 
contrast, in Denmark employment rates of married women with children differ little from those of 
married women without children. In the UK, too, married women’s employment rates decline much 
less with increasing number of children, except for the group of women with 4 or more children.  
Figure 1b documents the relationship between employment rates and the age of the youngest 
child in the household. Again, this relationship seems to be very weak in Denmark, whereas the 
presence of children below the age of 3 years in the household is associated with an extremely low 
average employment rate of only about 25% Germany, compared to more than 86% in Denmark, 
about 60% in the UK and almost 50% in Italy. The other striking country difference is that 
employment rates of mothers with older children do not differ much from those with small children 
in Denmark and Italy, whereas in the UK and especially in Germany employment rates of mothers 
with older children are much higher. For example, in Germany the average employment rate of 
mothers with children aged 4-6 years is almost 60%, compared to 25% for mothers with small 
children, and almost 80% for women with children aged 12-19 years. A similar if less extreme 
pattern is also observed for the UK.  
Figure 2a shows that the number of children seems to be only weakly related to average 
weekly working hours of employed married women in Denmark, whereas there is a modest negative 
relationship between these two variables in Italy. In both Germany and the UK, the more children 
there are in the household, the smaller the number of working hours of employed mothers, where 
the magnitude of this correlation seems to be very similar in these two countries. For example, 
whereas employed married women without children work about 40 hours per week in both 
Germany and the UK, this number declines to about 30 hours in the presence of one or two 
children. As shown in Figure 2b, working time of employed married mothers also differs little by 
the age of the youngest child in Denmark and Italy, whereas in Germany and the UK average 
working time of employed mothers with children is significantly smaller than that for married 
women without children.  
Of particular interest for the subsequent empirical analysis is the relationship between married 
mothers’ labor market behavior and childbirth. Here, we use the panel structure of our data base and 
calculate employment rates and working hours of married mothers the year before childbirth, in that 
year, and in a number of subsequent years for the four countries. Figure 3a shows that employment  
                                                 
5  We aggregate the two years to increase number of observations and average out cyclical factors.   9
Figure 3  Employment rates and average working hours in the year before childbirth, at childbirth, 
and in subsequent years by country (1994 – 2001). 
 










Source:  ECHP, waves 2000/2001, own calculations.    10
rates of mothers only slightly decrease in the year of childbirth in Denmark and Italy, but drop from 
roughly 60% the year before childbirth to less than 20% the year of childbirth in Germany, and 
from more than 70% to about 50% in the UK. To some extent, the dramatic decline of the 
employment rate of German mothers following childbirth is reversed in subsequent years: 3 years 
after childbirth, mothers’ employment rate has, on average, increased by about 30 percentage points 
to a level of almost 50%, still considerably below the employment rate before childbirth. Hence, 
both the short-run and longer-term effects of childbirth on employment of mothers seem to be much 
more pronounced in Germany than in the other countries analyzed here.  
A similar picture emerges regarding the relationship between childbirth and working hours of 
employed married mothers, as shown in Figure 3b. In Denmark and Italy, average working hours of 
employed mothers change little in the years following childbirth, whereas there is a marked decline 
in working hours of this group in Germany and the UK which subsequently stabilize at a somewhat 
lower level than prevailing the year before childbirth. This, again, suggests that the short-run and 
long-term effects of childbirth on married women’s employment behavior are quite different across 
countries. 
Having established some empirical evidence on the relationship between married women’s 
employment behavior and the presence of children in the household we now turn to a more 
thorough empirical analysis based on dynamic employment and hours equations which will allow 
us to quantify the short-run and long-term effects of childbirth on married women’s labor market 
behavior. 
 
4  Dynamic Employment and Hours Equations  
To model the short-run and long-term effects of childbirth on married women’s employment rates 
and working hours, we need to specify dynamic employment and hours equations accounting for 
sluggish adjustment in labor market behavior. Individual employment rates and working hours 
between two consecutive periods are highly correlated. This empirical correlation can arise from 
“true state dependence” or from spurious correlation (see, e.g., Heckman 1981, 2001:704-712, 
Hyslop 1999). True state dependence in individual employment rates, for example, means that 
employment during the current period increases, for structural reasons, the likelihood of being 
employed in the next period. This structural dependence may be related to the accumulation of 
human capital or arise because continuous employment acts as a positive signal to firms screening 
job applicants. However, correlation in employment rates between two periods may also be purely 
spurious, for the following reasons (Heckman 1981a):    11
(i)  if the sampling scheme is such that a single employment spell, on average, overlaps two 
consecutive periods; 
(ii)  due to unobserved individual heterogeneity and/or serial correlation in time-varying 
error components; 
(iii)  if initial conditions or relevant pre-sample history of the employment process are not 
taken properly into account in the estimation.   
Given panel data it is, in principle, possible to account for these factors and identify true state 
dependence effects by specifying and estimating dynamic employment and hours equations, as 
described in the following. 
4.1 Specification 
To assess the influence of children on the labor market behavior of women, it is important to take 
into account that the presence of children not only influences the decision of the mother whether to 
seek employment or not (extensive margin) but also the amount of working hours (intensive 
margin). There are only a few studies which attempt to model both decisions within an 
intertemporal discrete choice model, Haan (2005) being the only study for Germany we are aware 
of. Here, we specify similar dynamic models for the two labor supply margins but estimate them 
separately.  
The dependent variable (married women’s employment status or working hours per week), yit, 
for woman i  in period t is expressed as a function of its lagged realization, yi,t-1, a row vector of 
explanatory variables, Zit, an individual-specific fixed effect, αi, and an error term varying across 
individuals and time, uit:  
(1)  ,1 i t i = +Z + ,     =1,...,N  and   =1,...,T   it i t i it yy ui t λ βα − +  
where the adjustment (“state dependence”) parameter λ and the column parameter vector β are to be 
estimated. Regarding the error components αi  and uit we will assume that there is no remaining 
autocorrelation in uit, after conditioning on yi,t-1 and Zit , that αi  and  uit are conditionally 







| , =0,    0,  =1,...,N  and   =1,...,T  
| , =0,        =1,...,N  and   =1,...,T                          
= 0,                   Z ,  0,1,...,  =1,...,N  and
it i t i t it
ii t i t i t
it it s it
Euu y Z i t








∀= i   =1,...,T.       t
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For the estimation of the λ and β parameters we need not make parametric assumptions on the 
distribution of the error components. In particular, we need not assume µi to be uncorrelated or even 
independent of the components in Z. Of course, αi  and yi,t-1 will be correlated, almost by definition. 
In the estimation, we will treat αi as individual-specific fixed effect and eliminate it by taking first-
differences of equation (1). The assumption that uit is serially uncorrelated can be tested, as 
described below, and additional lags of yi,t can be included in equation (1) if required.  
Estimating equation (1) with an individual’s employment status as a binary (0/1) variable 
gives the dynamic linear probability model. Compared to non-linear probability models, such as the 
panel probit or logit model, this model is not only easy to estimate on panel data but also requires 
less restrictive assumptions regarding the distribution of the error components as far as consistent 
estimation of the λ and β parameters is concerned. Marginal effects, such as the short-term and 
long-term effects of child-birth on mothers’ employment probability, can easily be derived from the 
model. Furthermore, this simple estimator circumvents the initial-condition problem, which 
constitutes a general problem of dynamic panel data models (see, e.g., Hyslop 1999, Wooldridge 
2005).
6 However, predictions from the model are not restricted to the unit interval and standard 
errors of estimated parameters will be biased, but this latter problem can be avoided as described 
below.   
We could have used the linear probability model to construct a selectivity-correction variable 
to be included in the second-step estimation of the conditional hours equation. Since this would 
have required the choice of some exclusion restrictions which, in the present context, are somewhat 
difficult to substantiate convincingly, we chose to estimate equation (1) without explicit selectivity 
correction under the assumption that selection bias can be avoided by eliminating unobserved 
heterogeneity. This would be the case if married women’s employment and working hours, 
conditional on Zit, yi,t-1 and αi , were only correlated through time-invariant individual effects. Since 
we estimate the employment and hours equations on an unbalanced panel (Ti varies across 
individuals), we also have to assume that sample attrition, conditional on Zit, yi,t-1 and αi , is purely 
random.
7 Before we describe how exactly we take these effects into account in the estimation, we 
briefly discuss the specification of Z in the employment and hours equations. 
                                                 
6  Croda and Kyriazidou (2005) apply a dynamic conditional logit model with fixed effects, which allows them to 
eliminate the unobserved heterogeneity and thereby also circumvent the initial condition problem. However, severe 
limitations of this approach are that individual-fixed effects can only be removed if the explanatory variables do not 
vary over time and that marginal effects cannot be calculated. 
7  Behr, Bellgardt and Rendtel (2005) show that response rates in the ECHP mainly depend on whether households have 
moved during the sample period and whether there was the interviewer changed, but that the resulting sample attrition 
has little effects on the distribution of incomes and the ranking of national results.    13
The explanatory variables of main interest in the subsequent analysis are those relating to 
childbirth. A dummy is created for the event of birth, since this event usually implies a certain 
period of hospitalization. Moreover, many leave legislations allow to take the maternal leave 
several weeks prior to childbirth. However, the data do not provide sufficient information about the 
exact month of birth. The Danish data do not provide this information for each child, and the 
German data do not include this information at all. The Italian and British data do provide this 
information, but only with numerous missing values. Thus, the dummy variable is coded 1 if a baby 
is less than one year old. It is also coded 1 if the child is already one year old, but the respondent 
did not report having a baby in the former wave.  
Since child care becomes less time intensive but more goods intensive as the child grows up, 
we would expect the strongest age effect to occur in the year of childbirth and the subsequent two to 
three years, especially in countries where public childcare coverage for infants is scarce. Thus, to 
account for the age of the youngest child, four dummies are included in both the participation and 
hours equation. The first dummy covers the period from one to three years of age. This dummy 
comprises children within the most care-intensive age group. The second dummy variable refers to 
children aged four to six years. Most countries provide private or public care, e.g. pre-schools, for 
this age group. The next dummy contains children between six and twelve years of age; where 
children typically start school at six. Teenagers aged twelve to nineteen are represented by another 
dummy, and having no child aged 19 or younger is used as the base category. The effects of the 
number of children (2, 3, and 4+) on married mothers’ labor market behavior are captured by a set 
of dummy variables. Note that the effect of having only one child cannot be separated from the age 
effect of the youngest child. The group of respondents having no children is used as the base 
category.  
In addition to yearly time dummies, we include several control variables. These include four 
dummy variables for the mother's age, a dummy for her health status as well as the household 
income excluding own earnings. A third set of variables includes information about the spouse, i.e. 
his employment and health status and whether he also looks after the children on a daily basis. 
Dummy variables describing the spouse's employment status are also included. Tables A1 and A2 
in the Appendix present summary statistics of the variables that are used in the data analysis for the 
whole sample and the sample of employed women, respectively. 
4.2 Estimation 
As mentioned above, we will treat µi as individual-specific fixed effect and eliminate it by taking 
first-differences (∆) of equation (1):   14
(3)  ,1 i t i = + Z ,     =1,...,N  and   =2,...,T.  it i t it yy u i t λ β − ∆∆∆+ ∆  
Given our maintained assumption about the error terms in equation (2), ∆yi,t-1 and ∆uit are 
obviously correlated and OLS estimation of equation (3) would yield biased and inconsistent 
parameter estimates. Consistent estimates can be obtained, however, by instrumenting ∆yi,t-1  in 
equation (3). Given the panel structure of our data base and the assumption that the initial condition 
yi,1 is uncorrelated with yi,t, for t =2, 3,..., Ti , i.e. it has to be predetermined, appropriately lagged 
levels and differences of yi,t for observations with Ti≥3 are potentially valid instruments for ∆yi,t-1.
8 
Following Arellano and Bond (1991), we use appropriately lagged levels of the dependent variable 
as instruments to construct a GMM estimator.  
Since Ti > 3 for most individuals in the panel, there is a large number of such instruments 
available. To test the validity of over-identifying restrictions, we apply the Sargan test (Arellano 
and Bond 1991). However, lagged levels might not be adequate instruments for first differences in 
case of persistent variables, such as individual employment rates. Therefore, we alternatively apply 
the "System-GMM" estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998), which also uses lagged differences as instruments for the equations in levels, under the 
assumption that the individual-fixed effect is not correlated with the first-differenced error terms.  
To select a valid model for both the employment and the hours equation, each model is 
estimated with three different sets of instruments, with the lag length of instruments being restricted 
to t-4 for the equation in differences and to t-3 for the equation in levels. The first set of instruments 
("levels") uses lagged levels as instruments for the first differenced equation, whereas the second 
set of instruments ("differences") uses lagged differences for the equation in levels, and the third set 
of instruments ("system") uses both lagged differences as well as lagged levels as instruments. For 
every specification, a Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions and autocorrelation tests are 
calculated. If the system estimator results in the lowest Sargan statistic, it is preferred to the others. 
If more than one model yields valid test statistics, a Difference Sargan test (Arellano and Bond 
1991) is computed. To this end, the model in differences or levels reporting the lowest Sargan 
statistic is used as base and tested against the system estimator. However, it is only possible to test 
the system against one of the other models but not the other two specifications against each other. If 
no model leads to valid test statistics, the system estimator is chosen on the basis of its superior 
overall behavior. 
 
                                                 
8  There would be no such instruments if the within-transformation were applied to equation (1) to eliminate αi because 
this transformation would obviously induce correlation between the transformed error term and the transformed 
lagged dependent variable which would be an average of all leads and lags of yi,t-1.    15
5 Estimation  Results 
5.1 Employment  equation 
For each of the four countries, the preferred specification (“differences”, “levels”, “system”) of the 
employment equation was selected on the basis of the principles described at the end of the 
previous section. Full estimation results for the alternative specifications are reported in Table A4 in 
the Appendix. As suggested by the test statistics reported at the bottom of the table, the preferred 
specifications in terms of chosen instruments is “levels” for Denmark, “differences” for Italy and 
“system” for both Germany and the UK. These specifications pass the Sargan and Sargan 
Difference as well as the autocorrelation tests, except for weak evidence of second-order 
autocorrelation in case of Germany. However, the Difference Sargan test against the levels 
specification shows that the additional instruments are accepted at the 5% level (test statistic is 7.54 
with 6 degrees of freedom). Therefore, the GMM system estimator is chosen. For each country, the 
main difference in estimation results between the various specifications relates to the coefficient on 
the lagged dependent variable (“state dependence” parameter), whereas the other estimated 
coefficients differ little across specifications. 
Table 2 summarizes estimation results for the lagged dependent variable and the child 
dummies in our preferred specification of the employment equation for each of the four countries. 
Estimated coefficients of these variables are of main interest since together they determine the 
short-run and long-term effects of childbirth on married mothers’ employment rates and working 
hours. The estimated coefficient on the lagged employment status, i.e. the λ coefficient in 
equation (3), ranges from about 0.25 in Denmark to about 0.3 in Germany, Italy and the UK. Thus, 
all four countries exhibit a similar degree of state dependence in married women’s employment 
rates. The interpretation of this effect is the following: In Germany, for example, the current 
employment rate of a married women who has already been employed in the previous year is about 
30 percentage points higher than it would have been had she been non-employed the year before. 
This interpretation assumes that all other factors affecting individual employment rates are 
effectively controlled for by the individual-specific effect and the time-varying explanatory 
variables included in model. When comparing state dependence effects between countries it should 
be kept in mind that, on average, employment rates of married women differ greatly (see section 3). 
Thus, in relative terms, the state dependence effect in Italy is even greater compared to Germany, 
for example, than indicated by the estimated coefficients in Table 2. 
One useful model check is to compare the λ coefficient estimate obtained form the first-
differenced GMM estimator to the one obtained from a simple OLS regression of equation (1) and 
from the within-transformation of this equation (Fixed-Effects estimator), because a consistent esti-   16
Table 2  Estimation results for participation equations - GMM estimation with alternative set of 
instrumental variables 
  Denmark Italy Germany  UK 
  Levels Differences System  System 
Employed  (t-1)  0.255 0.358 0.289 0.325 
  (0.043) (0.035) (0.018) (0.026) 
Birth  -0.158 -0.060 -0.582 -0.290 
  (0.025) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) 
Child,  0-3  years  -0.047 -0.074 -0.351 -0.202 
  (0.020) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017) 
Child,  4-6  years  -0.019 -0.066 -0.186 -0.141 
  (0.020) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) 
Child,  7-11  years  -0.022 -0.053 -0.089 -0.093 
  (0.018) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) 
Child,  12-19  years  -0.008 -0.032 -0.029 -0.026 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
Two  children  0.010 -0.072 -0.014 -0.030 
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) 
Three  children  0.019 -0.130 -0.069 -0.064 
  (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Four+  children  -0.027 -0.192 -0.153 -0.159 
  (0.033) (0.029) (0.032) (0.033) 
Number  of  observations 4971 17023 15608 10066 
Number  of  individuals  1043 3387 2965 1995 
P-Value  0.99 0.00 0.08 0.44 
AR1  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR2  0.60 0.06 0.02 0.90 
Notes: Yearly time dummies and a number of additional control variables not shown in the table 
are included in all regressions. Full estimation results are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
Standard errors are given in parantheses. For the interpretation of the Sargan, AR1 and AR2 test 
statistics see note to Table A3 in the Appendix. 
 
mate of the λ coefficient should fall between the lower and upper bound determined by these two 
estimators (Nickell 1981, Bond 2002). Since employment rates are positively correlated over time, 
the simple OLS estimator is upward biased, whereas the Fixed-Effects estimator is biased towards 
zero. As shown in the upper part of Table A6 in the Appendix, the expected pattern in fact obtains: 
λ coefficients estimated by OLS are always much larger than those reported in Table 2, with the 
estimate for Italy reaching a value of 0.84, almost three times the estimate obtained by the GMM 
“differences” estimator.  In stark contrast, the Fixed Effects estimator is clearly biased towards zero, 
with estimated values for λ of about 0.1 for Denmark, Germany and the UK, and about 0.2 for Italy.    17
Before we turn to the long-term effects of childbirth on married women’s employment rates, 
which are partly determined by the size of the estimated λ coefficient, we discuss the short-run 
effects of childbirth and the impact of other child related variables summarized in Table 2. 
Estimated coefficients of the childbirth dummy indicate huge country differences in the short-run 
effects of childbirth on married mothers’ employment rates which more or less confirm the pattern 
documented in Figure 3a. That is, even after conditioning on previous employment status and 
controlling for observed and time-invariant unobserved factors, the impact of childbirth on married 
mothers employment rates is much larger in Germany than in any of the other three countries: 
Whereas childbirth reduces mothers’ employment rate by almost 60 percentage points in Germany 
in the year of birth, on average, this short-run effect amounts to about 30 percentage points in the 
UK, 16 percentage points in Denmark and only 6 percentage points in Italy. Although these effects 
have to be interpreted in relation to the different employment levels in the four countries, Germany 
clearly is an outlier concerning the impact of childbirth on married mothers’ employment rates, 
whereas there seems to be relatively little difference in this respect between Denmark and Italy, two 
countries with greatly differing employment rates of married women. 
Regarding the age and number of children on married mothers’ employment rates estimation 
results in Table 2 also reveal pronounced country differences in the short run. Although the younger 
the child, the stronger its negative impact on mothers’ employment rate tend to be in each country, 
age differences in these short-run effects are much more pronounced in Germany than in any of the 
other three countries. The employment rate of German married mothers with a new-born baby is, on 
average, about 35 percentage points lower than that of comparable mothers with a child aged 1-3 
years. In Denmark and the UK this relative effect amounts to about 10 percentage points, whereas it 
is virtually zero in Italy. In stark contrast to the relatively weak age effect in Italy, the presence of 
more than one child in the households has a markedly stronger negative impact on married mothers 
employment rates there than in either Germany or the UK. In Denmark, having more than one child 
seems to have no statistically significant short-run effects on employment rates of married mothers.  
Simulated  long-term effects of childbirth on married mothers’ employment rates across 
countries are illustrated in Figure 4. These simulations are based on estimation results from the 
preferred model specification for each country and refer to married mothers having one child before 
giving birth to a new one, and all other explanatory variables in the model set at either the base 
category in case of dummy variables or sample means (see Table A4 in the Appendix). The 
simulations assume that, conditional on the other explanatory variables in the model, the estimated 
effects of the child’s age – from the year of birth to adulthood – can be treated as if they were 
observed over the child’s early lifecycle, although we effectively observe only a snapshot of eight 
years at most and effects are estimated on the basis of the information contained in the first   18
differences of the respective variables only. To avoid out-of-sample predictions, we restrict the 
simulations to the time horizon covered by our observation period, i.e. to eight years.  
 









































Note: The graphs refer to average employment rates of married women with 2 children and other characteristics defined 
by the base category of the respective variables, see Table A1 in the Appendix. 
Source:  Own simulations based on estimation results in Table 1.  
 
The figure shows pronounced country differences in the dynamics of married mothers’ employment 
rates following childbirth: In Denmark, after a modest decline in the year of childbirth, the 
employment rate returns quickly to its high previous level, which is reached when the child 
becomes 4 years of age. That is, there is no long-term negative effect of childbirth on married 
women’s employment rates is Denmark. In the other three countries, though, long-term effects of 
childbirth on employment rates are negative, but both the magnitude of these effects and the 
dynamic adjustment process in employment rates differ significantly across countries. In Italy, the 
employment rate remains at its slightly lower level it reaches after childbirth irrespective of the 
child’s age. Thus, childbirth seems to have a negative long-term effect on employment rates of 
married women in Italy, although the magnitude of this effect is rather small.  
In Germany and the UK, the long-term employment effects of childbirth are similar and of 
modest size.
9 However, the adjustment process in employment rates is quite different in the two 
countries: Not only is the negative short-term effect of childbirth in Germany much stronger than in 
                                                 
9  Estimation results show that the long-term effect would be slightly negative in Germany but would not be statistically   19
the UK, its negative impact on employment rates of married mothers is much more pronounced 
when the child is between 1 and 3 years of age and still significant when the child is aged between 4 
and 6 years. The differential impact of childbirth on married mothers’ employment rates in the two 
countries only disappears when the child has become 7 years of age.  
We will discuss potential reasons for these country differences in the adjustment of 
employment rates to childbirth in section 6, after the effects of childbirth on married mothers’ 
working hours have been presented. 
5.2 Hours  equation 
Following the model selection strategy described in the previous section, we have estimated and 
tested various specifications of the hours equation for each country which differ in the chosen set of 
instrumental variables. Full estimation results for the alternative specifications and test results are 
reported in Table A5 in the Appendix. At first sight, estimation results are puzzling since, using 
only lagged levels as instruments for the lagged differenced hours variable, the estimated coefficient 
on this variable – the state dependence parameter – is insignificant (at the 5% level) for all 
countries, although all tests suggest the specification to be valid. As discussed in the previous 
section, a consistent estimate of the state dependence parameter in a linear dynamic panel model 
should be bounded by the simple OLS and the Fixed-Effects estimates, which range between about 
0.7 and 0.1, see Table A6 in the Appendix. Furthermore, the “levels” and the “system” 
specifications show completely different results in each case. As described in the literature (see, 
e.g., Blundell et al. 2000), applying the standard “differenced” GMM estimator to panel data with 
highly persistent dependent variables, such as weekly working hours, may raise estimation 
problems. We therefore follow suggestions in the literature and estimate the hours equation for all 
four countries using the GMM system estimator instead. Except for the Sargan test for over-
identifying restrictions in the case of the UK, this specification passes all tests and also yields 
plausible estimates of the state dependence parameter for each country.  
Table 3 summarizes estimation results for the state dependence coefficient and the child 
dummies in our preferred specification of the hours equation for each of the four countries. The 
estimated λ coefficient in the hours equation varies rather little across countries, form from about 
0.25 in Germany to 0.33 in the UK. The interpretation of the state dependence effect in the hours 
equation is the following. In Germany, for example, a married women who worked 40 hours in the 
previous period, say, works about 5 [=0.25×(40-20)] hours more in the current period than she 
would, had she worked only 20 hours in the previous period. This interpretation is valid if all other  
                                                                                                                                                                  
different from zero for the UK.     20
Table 3  Estimation results for the hours equation - GMM system estimation 
  Denmark Italy Germany  UK 
Working  hours  (t-1)  0.310 0.287 0.251 0.327 
  (0.044) (0.047) (0.112) (0.044) 
Birth  -1.274 -2.701  -10.325 -7.474 
  (0.829) (0.492) (1.708) (0.688) 
Youngest  Child,  0-3  years  -1.327 -1.978 -8.630 -8.701 
  (0.809) (0.425) (1.840) (0.755) 
Child,  4-6  years  -0.936 -1.568 -7.584 -7.390 
  (0.772) (0.426) (1.461) (0.835) 
Child,  7-11  years  -1.323 -1.808 -5.155 -6.368 
  (0.701) (0.402) (1.045) (0.764) 
Child,  12-19  years  -0.423 -0.748 -1.940 -2.709 
  (0.514) (0.363) (0.816) (0.607) 
Two  children  -0.452 -0.389 -0.872 -1.913 
  (0.475) (0.318) (0.490) (0.422) 
Three  children  -1.286 -0.596 -1.187 -2.450 
  (0.534) (0.508) (0.846) (0.677) 
Four+  children  -1.751  1.383 -2.603 -1.813 
  (1.435) (1.991) (1.921) (1.515) 
Number  of  observations 4149 7588 8737 7155 
Individuals  974  1817 2200 1648 
P-Value  0.40 0.29 0.27 0.03 
AR1  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR2  0.06 0.95 0.12 0.00 
Notes: See notes to Table 2. Full estimation results are reported in Table A4 in the Appendix. 
 
factors correlated with individual working hours are effectively controlled for by the individual-
specific effect and the time-varying explanatory variables included in model.  
The state dependence effect refers to employed women only because hours equations are 
estimated on the sub-sample of employed people for whom we observe a positive wage. 
Furthermore, as already mentioned in the previous section, differences in the level of working hours 
should be taken into account when interpreting state dependence effects between countries. These 
caveats should also been kept in mind when interpreting the short-run effects of childbirth as well 
as the number and age of children on working hours summarized in Table 3.    21
Figure 5  Short-run and longer term effects of childbirth on married mothers’ average weekly working 











































Note:  The graphs refer to the average number of working hours of married women with 2 children and other 
characteristics defined by the base category of the respective variables, see Table A1 in the Appendix. 
Source:  Own simulations based on estimation results in Table 2.  
 
In Italy and especially in Denmark, these effects are generally rather small. For example, the short-
run effect of childbirth on married mothers weekly working time is 2.7 and 1.3 hours, respectively; 
short-run effects of the presence of older children in the household are even small in these two 
countries. This is also true for Germany and the UK, but the magnitude of these effects is much 
different. Childbirth reduces, in the same year, the weekly working time of employed married 
mothers by about 10 hours in Germany, and by almost 9 hours in the UK. The short-term effects of 
having children of pre-school age on mothers’ working hours are of similar size in both Germany 
and the UK, with older children having markedly smaller negative effects in both countries. Having 
more than one child has a relatively weak impact on mothers’ working time across all countries. 
Performing similar simulations as in the previous section under the maintained assumption 
that the estimated effects of the child’s age represent different stages of the child’s early lifecycle, 
the long-term effects of childbirth on married mothers’ working hours can be derived. Figure 5 
shows these effects for the four countries, again for married mothers with one child before 
childbirth and all other explanatory variables in the model set at either the base category in case of 
dummy variables or sample means (see Table A5 in the Appendix). In all four countries, the short-
run effect clearly dominates the adjustment of working hours to childbirth. Even in Germany and 
the UK, where childbirth reduces working hours of married mothers substantially in the short-run,   22
as already discussed above, there is very little adjustment of working hours towards the level 
attained before childbirth even in the longer term, i.e. when the child enters primary school. In fact, 
neither for Germany nor for the UK is the small increase in employment rates after the year of birth 
of the child visualized in Figure 5 statistically significant.
10  
 
6  Summary and Conclusions  
Our comparative empirical analysis has revealed significant differences in the effects the birth and 
rearing of children on mothers’ employment behavior between Denmark, Germany, Italy and the 
UK, which represent different institutional regimes regarding labor market regulations and family 
policies. In Denmark, childbirth has little effect on mothers’ employment and working hours, both 
in the short run and in the longer term. Although these effects are also relatively small in Italy, they 
have to be judged relative to the very low employment level of Italian mothers. In the UK and, in 
particular, Germany childbirth has very strong negative short-term effects on mothers’ employment 
and working hours. In long-term, mothers’ employment rates adjust towards the levels attained 
before childbirth both in Germany and the UK, although especially in Germany mothers’ 
employment rates remain substantially below its previous level until the child has reached school 
age. Denmark is the only country where mothers attain their previous employment level in the long-
term. Regarding working hours of employed mothers, there is little adjustment after childbirth in 
both Denmark and Italy, whereas in the UK and especially in Germany mothers reduce their 
working hours substantially in the year of childbirth and also work significantly shorter hours in the 
long term. For these two countries, state-dependence effects in working hours seem even more 
pronounced than in employment rates. 
Overall, country differences in the short-run and long-term effects on mothers’ employment 
and working hours this study has established, seem compatible with the prevailing combinations of 
labor market flexibility and family policies in the four institutional regimes prevailing in Europe. 
Although part-time work of women is widespread in Germany and the UK, the employment rate of 
German mothers is lower especially in the presence of small children. Germany, representing the 
conservative welfare regime, provides less support for the double income family with small 
children than the UK, but rather still supports the “male breadwinner” model with the wife caring 
for young children. The very strong negative short-run effect of childbirth on employment in 
Germany can be explained by the rationing of publicly subsidized child-care facilities for children 
below the age of three in Germany, whereas the subsequent adjustment of German mothers’ 
employment and working hours as the child grows older is compatible with the much easier access 
                                                 
10   Statistic significance is tested by pairwise comparisons of estimated coefficients of child-age dummies.     23
to subsidized child care for older children (see Wrohlich 2005, 2006). However, to some extent, 
Germany seems to compensate the negative effect induced by rationing of publicly subsidized child 
care by relatively flexible work schedules which enable to adjust mothers’ care activities and 
gainful employment. Another important factor contributing to discourage employment of married 
women in Germany, is the high tax rate on the income of the second-earner (see, e.g., Steiner and 
Wrohlich 2004). The UK, representing the liberal welfare state regimes, does not discourage double 
earner couples, but also does not provide comprehensive subsidized child care: Mothers might 
therefore often be forced to work part-time to reconcile child care responsibilities and employment, 
which is supported by in-work benefits for households with children (see, e.g., Haan and Myck 
2006) and flexible working time arrangements.  
Given the relatively small employment rates of Italian mothers, the empirically observed 
small adjustment in employment and working hours after childbirth in Italy compared to both 
Germany and the UK has different implications than for the Danish case, where employment rates 
and working hours of mothers are generally rather high and adjust little following childbirth. In 
Italy the labor market does not provide flexible working time arrangements and women mostly have 
to decide whether to work full-time or to completely withdraw from the labor market (Del Boca 
2002). Furthermore, similar to Germany, tax rates on the income of the second-earner are quite 
high. In Denmark, employment is rather stable at a very high level due to the comprehensive system 
of publicly provided child care, a high degree of labor market flexibility, and an income tax that 
does not discourage employment of secondary earners (see, e.g., Immervoll and Barber 2005).    24
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 Appendix 
 
Table A1  Number of married or cohabitating women by country and year, 1994 - 2001 
  Denmark Italy Germany UK 
Wave    All Working All Working All Working All Working 
1   876   756   2.844   1.365   2.483   1.708   1.718   1.266  
2   878   751   2.908   1.415   2.648   1.722   1.765   1.345  
3   860   739   2.970   1.459   2.707   1.793   1.812   1.383  
4   900   798   2.938   1.454   2.768   1.829   1.829   1.397  
5   831   739   2.834   1.434   2.640   1.749   1.850   1.419  
6   767   700   2.581   1.306   2.451   1.645   1.732   1.336  
7   717   665   2.316   1.169   2.261   1.529   1.608   1.227  
8   661   603   2.034   1.034   2.046   1.379   1.499   1.162  
Total   6.490   5.751   21.425   20.004   13.354   10.636   13.813   10.535  
Source:  European Community Household Panel (ECHP), waves 1994-2001; own calculations. 
 
 Table A2  Descriptive statistics 
  Whole sample  Working women only 
  Denmark Italy Germany UK  Denmark Italy Germany  UK 
Employment  rate  0.89  0.59  0.67  0.78     
31.45 17.69 20.59 24.43 35.64 35.09 31.88 32.16  Working hours 
(13.92) (18.94) (18.71) (17.90)  (8.36) (10.05) (13.48) (13.16) 
Birth    0.08 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.04 
Child, age 1-3   0.17 0.15 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.05 0.13 
Child,  age  4-6    0.12 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.11 
Child,  age  7-11    0.14 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.16 
Child,  age  12-19    0.19 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.20 0.26 0.29 0.20 
No child *   0.24  0.12  0.21  0.25  0.25  0.17  0.27  0.30 
One  child    0.25 0.31 0.29 0.23 0.28 0.32 0.29 0.23 
Two  children    0.34 0.41 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.39 0.35 0.34 
Three  children    0.11 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.11 
Four+  children    0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Age  20--24    0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 
Age 25-34 *   0.33 0.30 0.29 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.34 
Age  35-44    0.38 0.44 0.44 0.39 0.40 0.45 0.46 0.39 
Age  45-50    0.24 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.23 
Bad  health    0.01 0.03 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.06 
2.91 1.10 2.34 2.31 2.98 1.13 2.29 2.40  Gross other income 
(1.67) (0.97) (1.68) (2.00) (1.68) (0.97) (1.66) (1.91) 
Spouse works (0-14h) *   0.06  0.09  0.11  0.12  0.05  0.08  0.10  0.08 
Spouse  works  (15-37h)   0.50 0.20 0.07 0.12 0.50 0.20 0.07 0.13 
Spouse  works  (38-50h)   0.32 0.60 0.66 0.50 0.32 0.61 0.66 0.53 
Spouse  works  (50+h)    0.12 0.11 0.16 0.26 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.25 
Spouse in bad health   0.02  0.04  0.11  0.07  0.01  0.03  0.11  0.06 
Spouse looks after 
children  0.47 0.37 0.48 0.21 0.47 0.42 0.42 0.22 
1994  *    0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 
1995   0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 
1996    0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 
1997    0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 
1998    0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
1999    0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
2000    0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 
2001    0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 
  6212 20483 18219 12122  5506 10061 11957  9267 
Notes: * indicates base category; for working hours and gross other income, means and standard deviation (in parentheses) 
are given, for the other variable shares are reported. Gross other income is given in domestic currency, for Italy in 000's Lira. 
Source: European Community Household Panel, waves 1994-2001, own calculations. Table A3  Alternative dynamic specifications of empirical employment equations by 
country 
  Denmark Italy Germany  UK 
  System Levels  Differences  System Levels  Differences System Levels  Differences  System Levels  Differences
Employed(t-1)  0.348 0.410  0.255  0.414 0.358  0.459  0.289 0.277  0.304  0.325 0.332  0.338 
  (0.040) (0.046)  (0.043)  (0.027) (0.035)  (0.026)  (0.018) (0.023)  (0.019)  (0.026) (0.033)  (0.028) 
Birth  -0.153 -0.155  -0.158  -0.061 -0.060  -0.061  -0.582 -0.581  -0.582  -0.290 -0.290  -0.287 
  (0.026) (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.015) (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.020) (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020) (0.021)  (0.020) 
Child,  0-3  -0.043 -0.036  -0.047  -0.071 -0.074  -0.067  -0.351 -0.355  -0.341  -0.202 -0.198  -0.197 
  (0.020) (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.013) (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.019) (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.017) (0.018)  (0.017) 
Child,  4-6  -0.023 -0.022  -0.019  -0.063 -0.066  -0.061  -0.186 -0.188  -0.181  -0.141 -0.141  -0.140 
  (0.020) (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.013) (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.018) (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.018) (0.018)  (0.018) 
Child,  7-11  -0.022 -0.025  -0.022  -0.052 -0.053  -0.049  -0.089 -0.090  -0.088  -0.093 -0.094  -0.092 
  (0.018) (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.013) (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.016) (0.016)  (0.016) 
Child,  12-19  -0.003 -0.005  -0.008  -0.030 -0.032  -0.029  -0.029 -0.028  -0.028  -0.026 -0.025  -0.026 
  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.011) (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012) (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.014) (0.014)  (0.014) 
Two  children  0.016  0.017  0.010  -0.064 -0.072  -0.059  -0.014 -0.016  -0.012  -0.030 -0.030  -0.027 
  (0.012) (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.010) (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.013) 
Three  children  0.019  0.019  0.019  -0.118 -0.130  -0.108  -0.069 -0.071  -0.069  -0.064 -0.064  -0.063 
  (0.016) (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.018) (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) (0.018)  (0.018) 
Four+  children  -0.025 -0.013  -0.027  -0.177 -0.192  -0.160  -0.153 -0.154  -0.149  -0.159 -0.157  -0.157 
  (0.032) (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.026) (0.029)  (0.026)  (0.032) (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.033) (0.033)  (0.033) 
Age  group  21-24  -0.055 -0.052  -0.059  -0.111 -0.125  -0.104  -0.051 -0.051  -0.048  -0.057 -0.057  -0.057 
  (0.035) (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.023) (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.019) (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.018) (0.017)  (0.017) 
Age  group  35-44  -0.008 -0.010  0.003  0.034  0.036  0.030  -0.002 -0.001  -0.003  -0.004 -0.004  -0.004 
  (0.012) (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011) (0.010)  (0.010) 
Age  group  45-50  -0.005 -0.004  0.005  0.015  0.017  0.012  -0.047 -0.048  -0.047  -0.055 -0.054  -0.055 
  (0.013) (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012) (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.013) 
Gross other household income  0.008  0.007  0.009  -0.003  -0.002  -0.003  -0.012  -0.012  -0.012  0.000  -0.000  0.001 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) 
Bad  Health  -0.113 -0.105  -0.098  -0.023 -0.022  -0.021  -0.054 -0.056  -0.053  -0.043 -0.044  -0.041 
  (0.040) (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.016) (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.012) (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.016) 
Spouse  works  15-37  hours  0.003 0.004  0.018  0.034 0.037  0.033  0.029 0.028  0.031  0.139 0.135  0.136 
  (0.027) (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.014) (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.018) (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.019) (0.019)  (0.019) 
Spouse works 38-50 hours  0.001  -0.001  0.017  0.018  0.020  0.016  0.037  0.036  0.037  0.125  0.123  0.122 
  (0.028) (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.013) (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014) (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.018) (0.018)  (0.018) 
Spouse  works  51+  hours  -0.008  -0.011 0.004  0.036 0.037  0.033  0.046 0.045  0.047  0.113 0.111  0.110 
  (0.028) (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.015) (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.016) (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.019) (0.020)  (0.020) 
Spouse  in  bad  health  0.005  0.005  0.010  -0.038 -0.043  -0.033  -0.019 -0.018  -0.019  -0.022 -0.019  -0.019 
  (0.020) (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.015) 
Spouse  looks  after  children  0.014 0.016  0.014  0.060 0.062  0.054  0.026 0.026  0.026  0.101 0.102  0.099 
  (0.012) (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.011) (0.012)  (0.011) 
Number of observations  4971  4971  4971  17023  17023  17023  15608  15608  15608  10066  10066  10066 
Groups  1043  1043 1043  3387  3387 3387  2965  2965 2965  1995  1995 1995 
Sargan  statistic  20.32 12.07  2.51  42.62 28.90  34.58  24.42 16.88  20.80  16.12  5.21  9.83 
Instruments  42  36 36  42  36 36  42  36 36  42  36 36 
DF  16  10 10  16  10 10  16  10 10  16  10 10 
P-Value  0.21 0.28  0.99  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.08 0.08  0.02  0.44 0.88  0.46 
AR1  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 
AR2  0.38 0.29  0.60  0.03 0.06  0.02  0.02 0.02  0.01  0.90 0.95  0.99 
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Yearly time dummies are included in all regressions. Since the choice of instruments is restricted to a lag length of t - 4 
(levels as instruments) and t - 3 (differences as instruments), the models in levels and in differences always use 36 instruments. The system estimator uses 42 instruments, 
thus the Difference Sargan test has always six degrees of freedom. Sargan tests the validitiy of overidentifying restrictions, AR1 and AR2 against, respectively, first-order and 
second-order autocorrelation in the the differenced residuals. The model assumptions imply that the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation should be rejected, 
whereas the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation should not be rejected.  
 Table A4  Alternative dynamic specifications of empirical hours equations by country  - 
full estimation results 
  Denmark Italy  Germany  UK 
  System Levels  Differences  System Levels  Differences  System  Levels  Differences  System  Levels  Differences
hours (t-1)  0.310  0.094  0.342  0.287  0.213  0.338  0.251  0.004  0.293  0.327  0.114  0.405 
 (0.044)  (0.087)  (0.051)  (0.047)  (0.194)  (0.043)  (0.112) (0.211)  (0.049)  (0.044)  (0.038)  (0.034) 
Birth -1.274  -1.028  -1.125  -2.701  -2.721  -2.454  -10.325  -11.294 -10.222 -7.474 -8.410  -7.135 
 (0.829)  (0.805)  (0.511)  (0.492)  (0.554)  (0.494)  (1.708) (1.678)  (1.786)  (0.688)  (0.731)  (0.644) 
Child,  0-3  -1.327 -1.322 -1.071  -1.978 -2.198  -1.762 -8.630  -11.815  -8.113 -8.701  -10.874 -7.938 
 (0.809)  (0.735)  (0.580)  (0.425)  (0.822)  (0.416)  (1.840) (2.647)  (1.003)  (0.755)  (0.749)  (0.566) 
Child, 4-6  -0.936  -0.886  -0.765  -1.568  -1.765  -1.347  -7.584  -10.081  -7.019  -7.390  -9.531  -6.522 
 (0.772)  (0.884)  (0.555)  (0.426)  (0.811)  (0.423)  (1.461) (2.148)  (0.782)  (0.835)  (0.875)  (0.599) 
Child, 7-11  -1.323  -1.090  -1.007  -1.808  -1.984  -1.589  -5.155  -6.823  -4.801  -6.368  -8.162  -5.776 
 (0.701)  (0.644)  (0.529)  (0.402)  (0.968)  (0.404)  (1.045) (1.640)  (0.624)  (0.764)  (0.731)  (0.569) 
Child, 12-19  -0.423  -0.315  -0.200  -0.748  -0.818  -0.624  -1.940  -2.491  -1.740  -2.709  -3.542  -2.554 
 (0.514)  (0.587)  (0.477)  (0.363)  (0.652)  (0.369)  (0.816) (0.985)  (0.436)  (0.607)  (0.721)  (0.471) 
Two children  -0.452  -0.841  -0.535  -0.389  -0.338  -0.305  -0.872  -1.394  -0.816  -1.913  -2.914  -1.477 
 (0.475)  (0.385)  (0.371)  (0.318)  (0.381)  (0.310)  (0.490) (0.805)  (0.432)  (0.422)  (0.471)  (0.404) 
Three children  -1.286  -1.763  -1.125  -0.596  -0.634  -0.557  -1.187  -1.982  -1.246  -2.450  -3.681  -2.037 
 (0.534)  (1.016)  (0.646)  (0.508)  (0.623)  (0.494)  (0.846) (1.041)  (0.763)  (0.677)  (0.821)  (0.665) 
Four+ children  -1.751  -2.294  -1.166  1.383  1.328  -0.180  -2.603  -4.463  -2.341  -1.813  -3.101  -1.443 
 (1.435)  (2.275)  (1.150)  (1.991)  (1.801)  (1.453)  (1.921) (2.371)  (1.678)  (1.515)  (1.904)  (1.422) 
Age group 21-24  -0.023  -0.251  -0.102  -0.053  0.255  0.580  -0.362  -0.325  -0.326  -0.499  -0.609  -0.099 
 (0.966)  (1.431)  (0.694)  (1.902)  (1.335)  (1.263)  (0.574) (0.648)  (0.561)  (0.758)  (0.968)  (0.603) 
Age group 35-44  0.122  0.154  0.007  -0.227  -0.157  -0.213  -1.484  -1.810  -1.391  -0.069  -0.077  -0.018 
 (0.290)  (0.815)  (0.285)  (0.343)  (0.363)  (0.307)  (0.363) (0.745)  (0.328)  (0.343)  (0.440)  (0.332) 
Age group 45-50  -0.801  -1.106  -0.920  -0.726  -0.840  -0.742  -2.202  -2.880  -2.008  -2.189  -2.677  -1.825 
 (0.599)  (0.591)  (0.434)  (0.402)  (0.467)  (0.386)  (0.446) (0.931)  (0.428)  (0.446)  (0.508)  (0.418) 
Gross other household income  0.001  0.002  0.009  -0.486  -0.602  -0.479  -0.835  -1.119  -0.766  -0.037  -0.040  -0.052 
 (0.124)  (0.192)  (0.155)  (0.139)  (0.225)  (0.139)  (0.226) (0.274)  (0.150)  (0.077)  (0.095)  (0.073) 
Bad  Health  -1.149  -1.364 -1.220  -1.339  -1.397 -1.182  -0.127  0.032 -0.163  -0.702  -0.462 -0.886 
 (1.382)  (2.080)  (0.964)  (0.558)  (0.575)  (0.562)  (0.492) (0.414)  (0.362)  (0.497)  (0.693)  (0.476) 
Spouse works 15-37 hours  -0.286  -0.167  -0.864  -1.206  -1.363  -1.020  -1.128  -1.415  -1.124  -0.703  -0.900  -0.680 
 (1.758)  (5.095)  (0.895)  (0.500)  (0.511)  (0.482)  (0.627) (0.931)  (0.579)  (0.578)  (0.779)  (0.594) 
Spouse works 38-50 hours  -0.353  -0.230  -0.916  -0.260  -0.351  -0.132  0.223  0.225  0.181  0.004  -0.124  -0.038 
 (1.639)  (4.429)  (0.943)  (0.460)  (0.559)  (0.458)  (0.488) (0.681)  (0.473)  (0.557)  (0.610)  (0.559) 
Spouse works 51+ hours  0.720  0.923  -0.147  1.759  1.684  1.736  1.651  1.868  1.587  0.570  0.562  0.532 
 (1.560)  (4.160)  (1.001)  (0.651)  (0.921)  (0.649)  (0.625) (0.889)  (0.616)  (0.642)  (0.698)  (0.631) 
Spouse in bad health  0.819  1.017  1.135  0.293  0.270  0.309  -0.163  -0.216  -0.192  0.614  0.291  0.337 
 (0.908)  (1.163)  (0.828)  (0.398)  (0.567)  (0.389)  (0.341) (0.475)  (0.325)  (0.529)  (0.547)  (0.514) 
Spouse looks after children  0.623  0.512  0.385  0.218  0.227  0.183  -0.442  -0.450  -0.380  3.026  3.588  2.857 
 (0.753)  (1.252)  (0.455)  (0.219)  (0.245)  (0.217)  (0.323) (0.320)  (0.265)  (0.345)  (0.358)  (0.344) 
N 4149  4149  4149  7588  7588  7588  8737  8737  8737  7155  7155  7155 
Groups 974  974  974  1817  1817  1817  2200  2200  2200  1648  1648  1648 
Sargan statistic  16.77  14.25  18.31  18.60  7.49  21.53  18.94  8.22  9.74  27.66  14.80  23.39 
Instruments 42  36  36  42  36  36  42  36  36  42  36  36 
DF 16  10  10  16  10  10  16  10  10  16  10  10 
P-Value 0.40  0.16  0.05  0.29  0.68  0.02  0.27  0.61  0.46  0.03  0.14  0.01 
AR1 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
AR2 0.06  0.06  0.05  0.95  0.78  0.87  0.12  0.98  0.04  0.00  0.13  0.00 
Notes:  see Table A3. 
Source: European Community Household Panel, waves 1994-2001. Table A5  OLS and Fixed Effects estimates of the λ coefficient in the dynamic 
employment and hours equations 
 
  Denmark Italy Germany UK 
Employment  equation      
OLS  0.480*** 0.839*** 0.596*** 0.627*** 
  (0.012) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) 
Fixed  Effects  0.095*** 0.191*** 0.085*** 0.125*** 
  (0.015) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
Hours  equation      
OLS  0.702*** 0.763*** 0.776*** 0.730*** 
  (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Fixed  Effects  0.179*** 0.100*** 0.103*** 0.174*** 
  (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Notes: Estimated coefficients refer to equation (1) in the text. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The regressions 
include the same variables as those in table A3 and A4. 
 